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Frank Morris was an exemplar of public service, American-style.
More speciﬁcally, he represented the best of what public service at the
Federal Reserve System is all about. Perhaps not incidentally—and here
I write from my own personal experience of the man—Frank was a ﬁne
human being with whom, and for whom, to work. Simply put, I admired
him enormously. Looking back, I still do.
Personal qualities aside, Frank Morris’s service at the Federal Re-
serve was unusual in at least two important ways. First, Frank was
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, and therefore a regular
participant (albeit not always a voting member) in the deliberations of the
Federal Open Market Committee, for fully twenty years. Since World
War II only one other person has served on the FOMC for so long a span
of time. (Governor J. L. Robertson served as a Member of the Board from
1952 to 1973.) Second, as the discussion below will emphasize, the
particular twenty-year period during which Frank served in this capacity
saw an unusually large number of changes in the Federal Reserve’s
conduct of monetary policy, changes that reﬂected not only the evolution
of external economic circumstances but also substantive shifts in funda-
mental thinking about how monetary policy works and what this implies
for the central bank.
Frank responded to the challenges that this unusual time presented
with intelligence, good judgment, and a degree of interest and energy
that bordered on gusto. At the very outset of his FOMC service he served
as a member of the committee’s Subcommittee on the Directive (often
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the effort)—a group that, notwithstanding its technical-sounding name,
was asked to think through a variety of fairly fundamental ideas about
the conduct of monetary policy that were then new. Soon thereafter Frank
initiated, under the Boston Bank’s sponsorship, a series of conferences
designed to engage not only Federal Reserve ofﬁcials and staff but also
academic researchers, representatives of private-sector ﬁnancial institu-
tions, and even journalists in continuing this discussion. The ﬁrst such
conference, on “Controlling Monetary Aggregates,” took place on Nan-
tucket in June, 1969. To date there have been forty-ﬁve such conferences
in this series.
Frank clearly regarded the establishment of this conference series,
and over time its imitation by so many other Federal Reserve Banks, as
one of his most signiﬁcant contributions to the Federal Reserve System. I
think he would have been pleased that we are met today, to debate once
again substantive questions about the economics of monetary policy, at a
similar conference convened speciﬁcally in his memory.
The object of this paper is to look back, and ahead as well, at one of
the most central aspects of this ongoing discussion of monetary policy:
the proper role of interest rates. When Frank Morris ﬁrst joined the
Federal Open Market Committee, the Federal Reserve, like most central
banks at that time, made monetary policy by setting interest rates. The
same is once again true today. In retrospect, much of the intervening
experience proved to be a historical detour. But as the discussion below
emphasizes, the fact that central banks are again (in some cases, still)
implementing their monetary policy decisions by setting interest rates
nonetheless leaves open a number of potentially important issues.
The ﬁrst section of the paper sets the stage for this discussion by
laying out some familiar fundamentals showing how interest rates can
enter the monetary policymaking process in several different ways. The
next section reviews the major changes that took place along the way
from the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate-based monetary policy of the late
1960s to the interest-rate-based policy structure in place at the beginning
of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
The third section takes up three open questions surrounding today’s
interest-rate-based policy structure: (1) Has the Federal Reserve solved
the “nominal anchor” problem inherent in interest-rate-based monetary
policymaking? If not, would a shift to explicit inﬂation targeting (along
the lines of what the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank, for
example, have done) be helpful? (2) Is there a role in the monetary
policymaking process for interest rates other than the federal funds rate,
or whatever particular rate the Federal Reserve chooses to set? Equiva-
lently, is there a role for the prices of ﬁnancial assets, including equities?
(3) To what extent does the electronic revolution now under way in
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rate-based monetary policymaking?
The ﬁnal section concludes by posing a yet more fundamental
question: Where does the Federal Reserve’s once-and-yet-again interest-
rate-based policy leave us on the perennial issue of rules versus discretion
in monetary policymaking? And is that good or bad?
DISTINGUISHING THREE ROLES FOR INTEREST RATES
The place to begin in understanding not merely the role of interest
rates in monetary policymaking but how monetary policy works more
generally is to realize that the central bank is a monopolist. In highly
developed ﬁnancial systems like that of the United States, many market
participants can and regularly do buy or sell securities in amounts far
larger than the Federal Reserve’s normal operations. But they usually do
not move markets, much less exert a powerful inﬂuence over output,
employment, and inﬂation. By contrast, moving ﬁnancial markets to an
extent sufﬁcient to affect nonﬁnancial economic activity is precisely what
central banks seek to do.
The standard explanation for central banks’ ability to affect large
markets through small operations is that transactions by the central bank
are fundamentally different from transactions by private market partici-
pants. When the central bank buys securities, it makes payment by
increasing the reserve account of the seller’s bank, thereby increasing the
total volume of reserves that the banking system collectively holds. When
the central bank sells securities, it receives payment by reducing the
reserve account of the buyer’s bank, thereby reducing the total volume of
reserves. No other market participant can either increase or reduce the
total volume of reserves. The central bank is a monopoly supplier (and
withdrawer) of reserves.
This monopoly position matters because under any of a variety of
conceptions of the monetary policy process, banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions must hold reserves with the central bank in order to carry out
the economic functions that households and ﬁrms look to them to
perform. The traditional “money view” of monetary policy begins with
households’ and ﬁrms’ demand for bank-issued money, against which
banks must, by law, hold reserves (usually speciﬁed as some set fraction
of each bank’s outstanding deposits). When the monopolist central bank
reduces the supply of reserves, banks therefore must reduce the amount
of money that they supply to households and ﬁrms. As households and
ﬁrms compete with one another to hold the now shrunken supply of
money, their individual efforts to sell securities for money cannot
produce any more money but do, collectively, drive the price of securities
down—that is, they drive interest rates up.
Alternatively, in some countries today—for example, in the United
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United States since required reserve ratios were reduced in 1990 and
1991—banks’ motivation for holding reserve balances with the central
bank actually has little or nothing to do with reserve requirements. These
reserves are, instead, a necessary means of settling interbank transactions
through the central bank’s clearing mechanism. On any given day, a bank
may have more checks presented for payment than checks deposited. If
its reserve balance is insufﬁcient to cover the difference, its account at the
central bank will be overdrawn at the end of the day, in which case most
central banks will assess a penalty. If the central bank does not allow
“daylight overdrafts,” the bank must similarly maintain an adequate
reserve balance to cover such contingencies even on an intraday basis.
Although the banks’ reason for holding reserves is different, as long as the
need for settlement balances is related to banks’ volume of deposits the
implication of central bank operations is the same as under the “money
view.”
The “credit view” of monetary policy focuses on a different aspect of
the relationship between the ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial worlds, but for
this purpose it too leads to the same conclusion. Households and ﬁrms
look to banks to extend loans (credit). Banks can do so only to the extent
that they simultaneously create money—in other words, the respective
totals on the two sides of any bank’s balance sheet must always remain
equal. But if banks must create money in order to advance credit, and
creating more money means requiring more reserves, the central bank’s
role as monopoly supplier of reserves is again crucial. When the central
bank reduces the supply of reserves, banks have to cut back on their
lending, and the loan market will clear at a higher interest rate.
Under any of these different views of why monetary policy matters,
therefore, by exercising its monopoly power over the supply of its own
liabilities the central bank can inﬂuence the market-determined array of
interest rates (and prices) on all ﬁnancial assets. Alternatively, instead of
supplying a set quantity of its liabilities, the central bank can directly
determine the interest rate on any one class of debt instrument by simply
buying or selling whatever amount of securities—and therefore supply-
ing whatever amount of bank reserves—is consistent with market equi-
librium at the chosen level for the designated interest rate. In this case the
market equilibrium still determines all other interest rates, and the prices
of all other ﬁnancial assets, but the central bank in effect ﬁxes one interest
rate.
As William Poole’s seminal paper (1970) neatly showed, if all other
inﬂuences bearing on output and inﬂation (or whatever else constitutes
the ultimate objective of monetary policy) were completely known in
advance, it would make no difference whether the central bank con-
ducted policy by ﬁxing the supply of reserves or by setting an interest
rate. These alternative operating strategies would be fully equivalent.
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dictable, however, the choice of “instrument” by which to implement
policy matters for the effectiveness of policy. As Poole and a series of
subsequent researchers showed, in general the more uncertainty sur-
rounds the behavior of households and ﬁrms in the markets for goods
and services—for example, the strength of consumer spending, or of
business investment—the more advantage there is to ﬁxing the quantity of
reserves. By contrast, the more uncertainty surrounds behavior in the
ﬁnancial markets—households’ and ﬁrms’ demands to hold deposits
versus other assets, their desire to borrow, the willingness of banks to
lend, and so on—the more advantageous it is for the central bank to set
the price of reserves: in other words, an interest rate.
Hence the ﬁrst potential role of interest rates in the monetary policy
process—importantly, for one interest rate only—is as the instrument
variable that the central bank sets in order to implement its chosen policy.
Even if the central bank uses an interest rate instrument, however, there
remains the question of how it decides what level is appropriate. The
most straightforward approach would be to infer directly, from historical
or other relationships, the interest rate level that corresponds to whatever
level of nonﬁnancial economic activity, and hence whatever pace of price
inﬂation, the central bank seeks to achieve.
Here again, the fact that many inﬂuences bearing on output and
inﬂation are uncertain and, moreover, that the effect of interest rates on
both output and inﬂation plays out only over an extended period of time,
is crucial. To the extent that it is possible to observe along the way the
ﬂuctuation of other variables that might convey useful information about
imminent but as yet unseen movements of output and inﬂation, adjusting
the central bank’s chosen interest rate level in light of those observations
is clearly helpful. In the limit, if some one observable variable were to
bear a sufﬁciently close relationship to subsequent movements of output
and inﬂation, a plausible way to conduct monetary policy would be to
determine what path for that variable most closely corresponds to the
central bank’s ultimate objectives and then adjust the interest rate
instrument in whatever way is necessary to keep that variable as close as
possible to this implied path— in other words, to treat that variable as an
“intermediate target” of monetary policy.
What observable variable might exhibit such highly desirable prop-
erties? Probably none. But following the work of Milton Friedman and
Anna Schwartz (1963) and their many followers, the candidate that has
attracted by far the most attention during the last half-century of
monetary policymaking, not just in the United States but in many
countries with highly disparate economic structures and ﬁnancial sys-
tems, is one or another measure of deposit money. A second potential role
for interest rates in the monetary policy process, therefore, is again as an
instrument variable, but as the instrument that the central bank varies
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toward targeting the money stock.
Finally, regardless of how the central bank perceives its interest rate
instrument—indeed, regardless of whether the central bank uses an
interest rate instrument at all (as opposed to ﬁxing the quantity of
reserves)—the central bank is able to ﬁx at most one interest rate. Is there
a role for the others? More speciﬁcally, and in practical terms, most
central banks use an extremely short-term interest rate as their monetary
policy instrument variable. In the United States, the Federal Reserve has
for many years used the overnight federal funds rate. Is there a role in the
monetary policy process for long-term interest rates? Or for equity prices?
Once again, uncertainty and lags are the heart of the matter. If the
ﬂuctuations of long-term interest rates or equity prices contain informa-
tion about future movements of output and inﬂation—and, crucially, if
this information is incremental, in the sense of going beyond what is
knowable from simply observing the past movements of output and
inﬂation themselves, or the movement of the central bank’s own instru-
ment—then in general it is helpful to adjust the instrument in light of this
observed information. Treating long-term interest rates or equity prices
as an “information variable” in this way is conceptually equivalent to
treating money growth, for example, as an information variable. But since
no one expects the central bank to be able to keep either long-term
interest rates or equity prices closely along a designated trajectory, so that
the question of treating these variables as intermediate targets does not
arise, the idea is perhaps even more straightforward.
How can the central bank decide whether any or all of these three
roles for interest rates—as an instrument variable directly linked to the
ultimate policy objectives, as an instrument variable used in pursuit of an
intermediate target, or as one or more information variables—constitutes
a good way to conduct monetary policy? The answer in each case is
empirical. Moreover, because objective circumstances change over time,
so does the state of the relevant empirical evidence. It is not surprising,
therefore, that actual central bank practice changes over time as well.
INTEREST RATES IN FEDERAL RESERVE POLICYMAKING
SINCE 1968
When Frank Morris ﬁrst joined the Federal Open Market Committee,
in 1968, the committee made monetary policy decisions by setting a
short-term interest rate. Today, the FOMC makes monetary policy
decisions by setting a short-term interest rate. The fact that the rough
outlines of the policymaking process are the same at these somewhat
arbitrary beginning and ending points, however, masks what in reality
was an extremely rich set of developments along the way.
To begin, two aspects of the pre-1968 experience are particularly
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cluded in 1951, relieved the U.S. central bank of its World War II
obligation to support the prices of government debt obligations. Only
then did the deliberate use of monetary policy to achieve macroeconomic
objectives become possible. Rather than immediately turn to setting
interest rates, however, in the years following the Accord the Federal
Reserve focused on controlling the net free reserves (excess reserves less
borrowed reserves) of the banking system. Although most participants in
the process understood that, under certain conditions, variations in the
banking system’s net free reserves position closely corresponded to
movements of short-term interest rates, the FOMC nonetheless framed its
decisions in terms of free reserves. (One advantage of doing so was being
able to duck political responsibility for interest rate movements, on the
ground that it was “the market” that set interest rates; the Federal Reserve
merely set free reserves. This rationale has sometimes proved appealing
in subsequent years too, most obviously between 1979 and 1982.)
Second, in the early 1960s a number of economists, including most
prominently Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer (1964), had raised telling
objections to the free reserves strategy for conducting monetary policy. In
retrospect, a part of this line of analysis was not a valid criticism of what
the Federal Reserve was doing. One of the critics’ key points was that
setting free reserves was not a good way to control the money stock; but
the Federal Reserve at this time was not seeking to control the money
stock anyway. But other objections to the free reserves strategy, especially
the empirical ﬁnding that banks’ demand for excess reserves was interest
elastic, were closer to the mark.
By the late 1960s, therefore, the FOMC had largely given up its free
reserves strategy for simply setting a short-term interest rate (at ﬁrst the
Treasury bill rate, after a while the federal funds rate). But as inﬂation
developed into a, and then the, major economic policy issue, critics now
raised a new set of objections against the committee’s interest rate
strategy: First, there seemed to be a persistent tendency for the committee
to confuse the level of interest rates as the instrument of monetary policy
with the level of interest rates as an independent objective of monetary
policy. As a result, the committee often waited too long before changing
its designated interest rate level and, even then, made changes of
insufﬁcient magnitude.
Second, once inﬂation became a problem, Federal Reserve policy-
makers—like everyone else—found it difﬁcult to distinguish movements
of nominal versus real interest rates. As a result, the FOMC sometimes
associated higher observed interest rates with a tighter monetary policy
stance even when the nominal increase merely kept pace with, or even
lagged behind, rising inﬂation expectations.
Third, ever since Knut Wicksell’s (1907) classic contribution early in
the twentieth century, economists had fully understood that ﬁxing a
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problematic over the long run. The events of the 1960s and early 1970s
now caused some economists, most prominently Thomas Sargent and
Neil Wallace (1975), to raise this instability question about the short run
as well. In what became the conventional shorthand of the day, an interest
rate strategy for monetary policy left prices with no “nominal anchor.”
Following the empirical work of Friedman and Schwartz, and in
light of the analytical insights provided by Poole and others, one obvious
answer to each of these three problems was to adopt an intermediate
target based on some measure of money (or credit) growth. The FOMC
experimented with a variety of ways of doing so in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, though with little if any detectable impact on the Federal
Reserve’s actual monetary policy operations. Beginning in 1975, however,
the U.S. Congress, under Concurrent Resolution 133, required the Federal
Reserve to set explicit targets for money (and credit) growth, to announce
these targets in advance, and to report back to Congress on its success or
failure in meeting them. In October 1979, as U.S. inﬂation reached
double-digit levels in the wake of the second increase in world oil prices
imposed by the OPEC cartel, the Federal Reserve publicly declared that
it had intensiﬁed its dedication to controlling money. For a while the
FOMC even gave up directly setting the short-term interest rate, instead
using the quantity of nonborrowed reserves as a (supposedly) superior
instrument for hitting a money growth target.
The reversal came quickly. In October 1982 the Federal Reserve
publicly announced that it had lessened its dedication to its money
growth targets, a fact that had already become obvious to close observers
of U.S. monetary policy during the preceding summer. In 1987, Frank
Morris’s last full year at the FOMC, the committee gave up setting a
target for the narrow money stock (M1) but continued to set targets for
broader measures of money (M2 and M3). In 1993 the Federal Reserve
publicly acknowledged that it had “downgraded” even its broad money
growth targets—once again a change that most observers of U.S.
monetary policy had long since noticed. From 1993 until just this year,
when Resolution 133 ﬁnally lapsed, the Federal Reserve continued to
report to Congress “ranges” for broad money growth, but it scrupu-
lously avoided either designating these ranges as “targets” or giving
any other clue to their relevance, if any, to monetary policy. In July,
2000, for the ﬁrst time in a quarter century, the Federal Reserve
submitted its regular monetary policy report to Congress with no
mention of future money growth rates.
Did this sequence of developments over more than three decades
correspond to changes in how the Federal Open Market Committee really
made U.S. monetary policy? Or was all this mostly a matter of public
announcements and formalisms without substantive connection to actual
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what the FOMC did bore a strong relationship to what was said.
Figure 1, reproduced from Friedman and Kuttner (1996), plots for
1975 through 1987 the point estimates and associated 95 percent conﬁ-
dence intervals for the coefﬁcient, in a standard monetary policy reaction
function, on the observed percentage deviation of the actual M1 money
stock from the midpoint of the corresponding target range designated by
the FOMC. Speciﬁcally, the estimated reaction function relates each
month’s federal funds rate to twelve lags of itself, two lags of observed
inﬂation, two lags of the difference between the observed unemployment
rate and Robert Gordon’s (1993) estimate of the corresponding “natural”
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tantly, the data for both the observed and the target values of M1 at each
point refer to the M1 deﬁnition in use at the time as well as to the data
that the Federal Reserve had in hand at the time. (The common practice
of estimating such relationships using data revised long after the fact is
clearly misleading.)
The estimates plotted in Figure 1 rely on a time-varying-parameter
model that explicitly allows the interest rate response to an “M1 miss” to
vary over time. The upper panel displays the time series of recursively
updated estimates computed from the Kalman ﬁlter, in which any given
month’s estimate of this response relies on data only through that month,
and therefore corresponds to the behavior of monetary policy as observ-
ers at each point in time could have assessed it. The lower panel displays
the equivalent time series of response estimates computed from the
Kalman smoother, which uses data from the entire sample to construct
the retrospective minimum-mean-square-error estimate of each month’s
coefﬁcient.
The ﬁltered estimates provide no evidence that the M1 growth target
actually mattered for Federal Reserve policy in the ﬁrst two years or so
following the adoption of Resolution 133. The estimated coefﬁcient on the
M1 “miss” begins to rise modestly in late 1977, but it does not become
consistently signiﬁcant until early 1980, when it rises much more sharply.
It declines sharply in mid 1982, but remains signiﬁcant. It begins to
decline again in early 1985 and continues to do so, ceasing to be signiﬁcant
some time in 1986.
The smoothed estimates tell much the same story. From its peak in
late 1980 the coefﬁcient on the M1 “miss” declines steadily, and it has
become statistically insigniﬁcant by mid 1984. Only for the late 1970s do
the two sets of time-varying-parameter estimates present differing views
of monetary policy, in that the smoothed estimates indicate a positive
inﬂuence on the federal funds rate due to the gap between observed
money and the target range midpoint. In part, however, this apparent
difference merely reﬂects the imprecision of the estimated coefﬁcient in
the early part of the sample.
Figure 2, also reproduced from Friedman and Kuttner (1996), pre-
sents the results of a similar analysis for the Federal Reserve’s M2 target,
but extending through the end of 1995. The results are roughly in line
with those reported above for M1. The response to the M2 “miss” is
clearly signiﬁcant from mid 1980 through late 1986. Thereafter the
estimated coefﬁcient remains positive, but it is never again statistically
signiﬁcant.
In sum, the evidence is clear that the Federal Reserve did—for a
while— target money, in the sense that it directly varied the federal funds
rate in response to observed ﬂuctuations of either M1 or M2 that
departed from the corresponding stated targets. The failure to do so in
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explained away as a delayed, or cautiously gradual, response to the
new legislation. More interesting is the effective abandonment of the
money growth targets in the mid 1980s, when the pertinent legislation
remained in force.
The reason is not hard to discover. At some point in the 1980s—just
when is subject to dispute, and the answer differs between M1 and M2 in
any case—the relationship between money and either output or inﬂation
in the United States simply disappeared. Observed ﬂuctuations in money
no longer conveyed information about future movements of either
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intermediate target variable was gone. As a result, the Federal Reserve
once again sets the federal funds rate with an eye directly on output and
the implications of output for inﬂation. In this respect (although, notably,
not in others), the wheel has come full circle.
It is useful to emphasize that this set of developments over roughly
thirty years—in particular the same adoption and then rejection of money
growth targets, and for the same reason (that money lost its predictive
content with respect to output and inﬂation)—is more than just a U.S.
phenomenon. To cite just one example, the Swiss National Bank (SNB),
long regarded as one of the most “monetarist” among the world’s central
banks, has traveled roughly the same route. As Georg Rich, the bank’s
long-time director of research, has described the evolution of the bank’s
monetary policymaking, beginning in the mid 1970s the SNB’s “opera-
tional framework rested on growth targets for the money supply. The
SNB employed this framework until the end of 1999, when it abandoned
monetary targeting” (Rich 2000, p. 439). And the reason? Again in Rich’s
words, now referring to the SNB among other central banks, “many
central banks that had opted for monetary targeting woke up to the
unpleasant fact that the demand for money was highly unstable . . .
money growth often proved to be an unreliable predictor of inﬂation”
(p. 444).
We have returned to a world in which the central bank sets
interest rates, interest rates inﬂuence output, and output in part
determines inﬂation. In many respects this is where Frank Morris
entered in 1968.
THREE REMAINING ISSUES
U.S. monetary policymaking is, of course, not simply back where it
was thirty-odd years ago. Both the economy and the ﬁnancial system are
different today. Policymakers have learned more about what the central
bank can and cannot do. So have economic researchers, and so has the
general public. As a result, many aspects of the prior experience that most
observers would identify as mistakes are unlikely to be repeated.
But challenges remain. Looking forward, in the speciﬁc context of the
role of interest rates in monetary policymaking, three sets of questions
seem most apt.
The Nominal Anchor Problem: Is Inﬂation Targeting the Answer?
One issue that is not new is the need for a nominal anchor for the
economy in a regime based ultimately on the central bank’s setting a
nominal interest rate. As Bennett McCallum (1981) showed nearly two
decades ago, the limiting case of Wicksellian instability that Sargent and
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a consequence of a “pure interest rate peg” but is not a consequence of a
regime in which the central bank sets (and, presumably, varies) a nominal
interest rate at least in part as a means of inﬂuencing some nominal
magnitude. Although McCallum’s original demonstration of this distinc-
tion relied on an example in which the central bank sets the short-term
interest rate in part as a way of targeting the money stock, the more
general point carries over in full to the case in which the interest rate is
the instrument used to target inﬂation, among other macroeconomic
variables—which is exactly what the Federal Reserve now does. (McCal-
lum showed that merely having at least one nominal target, among others
that may be real—for example, output or employment—is sufﬁcient to
dispose of the price indeterminacy.)
These theoretical insights notwithstanding, it is fair to say that the
return to an interest-rate-based monetary policy regime, with neither
money nor any other nominal variable as an intermediate target, has left
many observers uneasy. In some countries—the United Kingdom, Swe-
den, Canada, Australia, among others—the chosen solution has been to
adopt a formal “inﬂation target.” Whether doing so is of positive value
remains to be seen. As Ben Bernanke and coauthors (1999) have shown,
in many cases the countries that have adopted inﬂation targeting do now
enjoy signiﬁcantly lower inﬂation rates than they did earlier on. But in
most cases the slowing of inﬂation in these countries had occurred before
the new regime was adopted. Hence the value of inﬂation targeting per
se remains unproved.
Exactly what “inﬂation targeting” consists of also remains unclear. In
the early stages of debate over this idea, it was sometimes taken to mean
that monetary policy would focus exclusively on inﬂation, with no regard
for real outcomes. (Parts of the bill offered in the U.S. Congress in 1996 by
the chairman of the Joint Economic Committee read in just this way.)
Although some economists and many central bankers probably would
favor such a change, the idea of relieving central banks of any responsi-
bility for output and employment attracted widespread criticism, and
advocates of inﬂation targeting quickly backed away from this interpre-
tation. In Mervyn King’s (1997) much-quoted phrase, such a regime
would amount to a policy of “inﬂation nutters.”
As Lars Svensson’s work (1997) has made clear, a different interpre-
tation of inﬂation targeting—the interpretation that seems to be accepted
by most of the central banks that have adopted this regime—is that it is,
in formal terms, fully consistent with the standard maximization of a
monetary policy objective function including both inﬂation and output.
One way to understand Svensson’s point is simply to recall that no matter
how many target variables monetary policymakers seek to inﬂuence, in
the end they have only one instrument with which to do so. Once having
decided on the setting of their instrument variable (that is, the level of the
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policy in terms of any of the target variables, including inﬂation.
The logical question to ask about all this is what, then, is new or
different? The usual answer given by advocates of inﬂation targeting is
that it makes explicit, and therefore transparent to the public, the central
focus of monetary policymaking. On close inspection, however, this claim
seems dubious.
The one part of the claim for transparency that seems unquestionable
is that inﬂation targeting, as it is now conventionally understood,
obligates the central bank to identify, quantitatively, its long-run inﬂation
objective. All inﬂation-targeting central banks do so. But if that were all
there is to it, inﬂation targeting would amount to no more than King’s
“inﬂation nutter” policy. If it is to be more than that, target(s) for one or
more aspects of real economic activity must also be involved. And if
explicitness and transparency are what inﬂation targeting is supposed to
be all about, those features should presumably apply to the central bank’s
real target(s) as well.
For example, Svensson has usefully shown that there is a direct
relationship between the relative strength of policymakers’ preferences
with respect to inﬂation and real output (or employment) and the length
of the time interval over which it is optimal for monetary policy to seek
to return inﬂation to the target rate, once some unforeseen development
has rendered it different. If the policy weight on output is large vis-a `-vis
that on inﬂation, it is best to return to the targeted inﬂation rate slowly,
so as to minimize the associated dislocation of real economic activity.
With only a small weight on output, it is optimal to return to the targeted
inﬂation rate more rapidly. In the limit, with no weight at all on output
or any other real variable—King’s “inﬂation nutter” case—the central
bank would always seek to return inﬂation to the targeted rate immedi-
ately after any disturbance.
Genuine transparency in an inﬂation targeting regime would there-
fore include not only an explicit, publicly stated, quantitative inﬂation
target but also an explicit statement of the speed with which the central
bank would seek to return to that target after a departure from it.
Although a few central banks that have adopted inﬂation targeting
regimes have taken this step (the Bank of Canada, for example), most
have not. As a result, either the inﬂation targeting regime is not really
transparent—in which case the “what is new?” question continues to be
apt—or inﬂation targeting is really an “inﬂation nutter” policy after all.
On either interpretation the policy seems unsatisfactory.
An analogy to yet another aspect of central banks’ responsibilities
may help to explain this tension. The point of having a lender of last
resort is that, under some circumstances, the central bank will come to the
rescue of a bank that is facing difﬁculty in meeting its obligations. But the
more banks come to rely on this potential safety cushion, the more risks
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that the central bank will actually be called upon to come to their aid.
Hence most central banks would prefer that bank decision-makers
believe that (and therefore act as if) lender-of-last-resort actions were
much less forthcoming than is actually the case. In short, the goal is the
opposite of transparency: to induce the belief that banks are pretty much
on their own, and so had better structure their balance sheets soundly,
even while maintaining the lender-of-last-resort facility at the ready.
Similarly, many monetary policymakers today seek to beneﬁt from
the “credibility” that goes with being perceived as all-out inﬂation
ﬁghters, while at the same time in fact taking real considerations like
output and employment into account. The object is not to be an “inﬂation
nutter,” merely to be seen as one. Once again, the tension with the
often-avowed goal of transparency is clear.
In the United States, which has not adopted inﬂation targeting, the
“inﬂation nutter” policy would be precluded by law. The prevailing
legislation charges the Federal Reserve to conduct monetary policy “so as
to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices,
and moderate long-term interest rates.” Abjuring any responsibility for
real outcomes would not be legal even if it were somehow thought
desirable. By contrast, there is nothing in the law to prevent the Federal
Reserve from deﬁning “price stability” as a speciﬁc rate of change
(perhaps zero) of a particular price index, and quantifying the relative
weight on “maximum employment” in terms of a Svensson-type speed of
return in the event of a departure.
Would the additional explicitness and transparency be valuable? In
particular, would they contribute to addressing the “nominal anchor”
problem inherent in interest rate-based monetary policymaking? No one
really knows. But at least on the basis of the experience of the past decade
and a half, it is hard to know what visible shortcoming in U.S. monetary
policy such a change might be expected to correct. To the extent that
setting interest rates leaves monetary policy without a nominal anchor,
that lacuna has had little apparent consequence recently.
Long-Term Interest Rates and Equity Prices as Information Variables?
The widely discussed recent experiences of two countries, the United
States and Japan, have raised once again a question of long standing: Is
there a role in the monetary policy process for interest rates other than the
short-term rate that the central bank uses as its policy instrument? And,
in parallel, is there a role for equity prices?
The aspect of the U.S. experience that has called renewed attention to
this issue is the dramatic rise in equity prices in the latter half of the 1990s.
Innumerable analyses have examined the effect of higher stock market
wealth in spurring consumer spending, the use of stock market assets as
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capital spending, and so on. More recently, some of the same questions
have also begun to appear in the context of residential real estate prices.
In short, the issue is whether the Federal Reserve should tighten
monetary policy in light of these developments in U.S. asset markets.
The Japanese experience is more dramatic and also two-sided. In the
1980s both equity prices and real estate prices (including prices for
commercial property) surged in Japan, in what has subsequently become
known as the “bubble economy.” In the early 1990s both equity prices
and real estate prices fell sharply, triggering bankruptcies and rendering
most if not all major Japanese banks insolvent. As a result, the Japanese
economy has stagnated for much of the last decade. Many analyses of
Japanese monetary policy have concluded in retrospect that policy
should have been tighter than it actually was during the “bubble” period,
and easier than it was once the bubble collapsed.
Following the discussion in the ﬁrst section of this paper, it is clear
that asset prices and long-term interest rates can potentially play a useful
role in the monetary policy process if they contain incremental informa-
tion about output or inﬂation, or any other macroeconomic targets that
policymakers seek to inﬂuence. The obvious question is, do they?
Tables 1 to 4 report the results of estimating a series of equations
designed to address just this question for the United States. Table 1 shows
the F-statistics summarizing a pair of baseline equations, one for real
output growth and one for inﬂation, that do not include any asset price or
long-term interest rate variables. Each equation includes four lags on both
the output variable (real GDP growth) and the price variable (growth of
the chain-weighted GDP price index), four lags on the federal funds rate
(taken as the Federal Reserve’s policy instrument), and four lags on the
growth of the M2 money stock. Data are quarterly. The sample is 1970:I
to 2000:II. Data for all variables other than the federal funds rate are
seasonally adjusted.
The results for the baseline equations reported in Table 1 are roughly
consistent with familiar ﬁndings throughout the empirical literature of
U.S. macroeconomic relationships. Inﬂation in particular is very highly
serially correlated on a quarterly basis. The federal funds rate contains
highly signiﬁcant further information about the subsequent movement of
both output growth and inﬂation. The M2 money growth rate contains
information that is marginally signiﬁcant in predicting output, but not
inﬂation.
Table 2 reports the F-statistics associated with adding to these two
baseline equations, one at a time, each of a series of further interest
rate and asset price variables: the long-term (10-year) Treasury bond
yield, the difference between the 10-year bond rate and the 1-year bond
rate, the difference between the Baa corporate bond rate and the Aaa rate,
the difference between the 3-month commercial paper rate and the
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(measured by the Standard & Poor’s 500 index). Hence for each of these
variables the question being asked is whether that variable has incremen-
tal information content, beyond that already contained in the variables
included in the baseline equations. In each case what is added to the
equation is a four-quarter lag, just as for the variables included in the
baseline equations.
In line with prior research, both the credit quality spread and the
paper–bill spread contain signiﬁcant incremental information about
subsequent movements in real output. None of the other three variables
do, and none of the ﬁve variables contain incremental information about
inﬂation.
Tables 3 and 4 report analogous results based on monthly data. Here
the real output variable is industrial production, the price variable is the
consumer price index (CPI-U), and the sample is 1970:1 to 2000:7.
Interestingly, the federal funds rate has signiﬁcant predictive content
Table 1
Significance of Variables in Baseline Equations




Output Growth .14 2.53**
Inflation 1.16 46.98***
Federal Funds Rate 5.14*** 4.47***
Money Growth (M2) 2.17* 1.01
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
Table 2
Significance of Potential Information Variables




Long-Term Bond Rate 1.90 1.54
Term Structure Spread 1.36 1.29
Credit Quality Spread 2.75** 1.95
Paper–Bill Spread 2.73** 1.63
Stock Price Increase .91 1.09
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
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predict neither output growth nor inﬂation. Among the other ﬁnancial
variables, all except stock prices contain at least some incremental informa-
tion about subsequent movements of both output growth and inﬂation.
Empirical evidence aside, does the Federal Reserve take equity prices
or long-term interest rates into explicit account in making monetary
policy? Some observers clearly think so. Just last spring, for example,
Albert Wojnilower described the outlook for forthcoming FOMC deci-
sions as follows: “Their likely decision, therefore, will be to raise the
federal funds rate one-quarter percent every time the open-market
committee meets. When and if both the NASDAQ and Dow averages are
soaring, the increase might be one-half percent. If the NASDAQ were
falling signiﬁcantly, maybe there would be no increase at all. A drop in
the Dow alone would have to be quite severe to stay the Fed’s hand. The
authorities will justify their actions on the basis of macroeconomic data,
Table 3
Significance of Variables in Baseline Equations




Output Growth 1.85** 1.28
Inflation 1.36 14.08***
Federal Funds Rate 1.37 2.65***
Money Growth (M2) 1.55 1.33
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
Table 4
Significance of Potential Information Variables




Long-Term Bond Rate 2.85*** 2.57***
Term Structure Spread 1.97** 2.24**
Credit Quality Spread 5.64*** 3.82***
Paper–Bill Spread 3.49*** 1.59*
Stock Price Increase 1.62 .67
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
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and monetary policy” (Wojnilower 2000, p. 1).
Alan Greenspan has offered a somewhat different view: “that there is
a form of asymmetry in response to asset rises and asset declines but not
if the rate of change is similar. In other words, central banks do not
respond to gradually declining asset prices. We do not respond to
gradually rising asset prices. We do respond to sharply reduced asset
prices, which will create a seizing up of liquidity in the system. But you
almost never have the type of 180-degree version of the seizing up on the
up side. If, indeed, such an event occurred, I think we would respond to
it. The actuality is that it almost never occurs, so it appears as though we
are asymmetric when, indeed, we are not. The markets are asymmetric;
we are not” (Greenspan 1999, p. 143).
In light of empirical evidence like that reported in Tables 2 and
4, in what way either the one-for-one linear approach inferred by
Wojnilower or the nonlinear (and, because of market behavior, asym-
metric) approach articulated by Chairman Greenspan corresponds to the
optimal exploitation of any information that might be contained in
ﬂuctuations of stock prices is, to say the least, a matter for further re-
search.
Does the Electronic Revolution Threaten Interest-Rate-Based
Monetary Policy?
Electronic advances in banking practices, including some already in
hand and others not yet visible but plausibly just over the horizon,
present opportunities as well as complications for central banks. The
question has recently arisen whether these technological advances might
threaten the efﬁcacy of monetary policy’s inﬂuence over inﬂation and
economic activity. That potential threat is worth considering, particularly
in the context of a monetary policy based on setting a short-term interest
rate.
More speciﬁcally, the threat to monetary policy from the electronic
revolution in banking is the possibility of a “decoupling” of the opera-
tions of the central bank from the markets in which ﬁnancial claims are
created and transacted in ways that, at some operative margin, affect the
decisions of households and ﬁrms on such matters as how much to spend
(and on what), how much (and what) to produce, and what to pay or
charge for ordinary goods and services. As the discussion in the ﬁrst
section emphasizes, all standard theories of how monetary policy works
have some explicit coupling mechanism that connects the purely ﬁnancial
operations of the central bank to the nonﬁnancial decisions made by
households and ﬁrms: Banks are legally required to hold reserves at the
central bank in order to issue the claims that the public uses for everyday
transactions. Or, banks are required to hold reserves at the central bank
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by issuing money can banks create the credit that the public needs. Or,
banks have to hold settlement balances at the central bank in order to
carry out their business, and the settlement balances they need are
naturally related to the size of their operations. Each of those stories has
in it a mechanism that links the operations of the central bank not just to
ﬁnancial quantities, interest rates, and other asset prices but, via well-
understood accounts of household and ﬁrm behavior, to the evolution of
output and prices in the nonﬁnancial economy.
There is both a price (interest rate) and a quantity interpretation of
what “decoupling” would mean in this context. The price interpretation,
which is what is relevant to this discussion, is that the interest rate that
the central bank can set on the exchange of its own liabilities for other
claims becomes, at the margin of increase or decrease, less tightly (in the
limit, not at all) connected to the interest rates and other asset prices that
matter for ordinary economic transactions.
Some speciﬁc examples may help to illustrate the central idea. One is
the loan-shark industry, in which some lenders charge, and some
borrowers pay, extremely high interest rates compared to prevailing rates
in more conventionally constituted credit markets. The interest rate in
this market is simply not connected, at the relevant margin of increase or
decrease, to most interest rates that prevail in the rest of the ﬁnancial
world. In technical terms, it is an outcome determined by the actions of
decision-makers who are at a corner solution.
A second example: Within the past year an unusually wide spread
has opened up between the interest rate on long-term U.S. Treasury
securities and interest rates on similar instruments like high-grade
corporate bonds and securities collateralized by insured mortgages. The
apparent reason is the projected scarcity of long-term Treasury bonds. If
the U.S. government continues on its currently projected path, in which
all outstanding Treasury obligations are to be retired within another
decade or so, this scarcity value will become progressively greater. When
only, say, $100,000 of long-term Treasury bonds are left outstanding, it
will be very easy for the Federal Reserve—or anybody else, for that
matter—to drive the interest rate on these bonds arbitrarily close to zero
(or even below zero, should anyone choose). But by that time, this interest
rate will have become completely disconnected from the interest rates
that matter for the public’s ordinary economic transactions.
Students of monetary policy have long understood that the coupling,
at the margin, of operations by the central bank and the decisions of
households and ﬁrms is crucial to monetary policy’s inﬂuence over
output and inﬂation. The issue today is whether new technological
developments, over the foreseeable future, may plausibly threaten a
decoupling at the relevant margin. Such a decoupling could come about
in either of two basic ways.
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and the like—may increasingly compete with bank checking accounts
and, further, develop to the point at which balances on the books of the
nonbank entities that issue such cards are accepted in payment by third
parties. What matters for the efﬁcacy of monetary policy is that the claims
people exchange in order to execute transactions continue to be claims on
the books of banks (or, equivalently, claims backed one-for-one by bank
deposits). The possibility that this may cease to be true is a key part of the
threat that the e-revolution presents for monetary policy.
Once again, it is important to emphasize that the argument is one
that pertains at the margin. The question is not whether bank deposits will
disappear altogether (they will not), or whether no one will any longer
use currency (some people will), but whether plausible alternatives not
backed by bank deposits—credits on the books of the telephone com-
pany, for example—will weaken the connection between the expansion
or contraction of reservable bank deposits, and hence the increase or
decline of whatever interest rate the central bank sets, and the expansion
or contraction of economic activity.
In theory, of course, one could always get around this problem by
simply deﬁning as a “bank,” for purposes of meeting reserve require-
ments, any entity in the business of providing such claims: the telephone
company, the New York City subway system, Microsoft, in principle any
ﬁrm whose product would be in sufﬁciently broad demand to render its
liabilities generally valued. In Friedman (1999) I considered the possibil-
ity of a race between authorities seeking to contain this activity within the
fence of such regulation and innovators seeking to escape it. I am
skeptical of the regulators’ prospects for success. History suggests that
the innovators are likely to be ﬂeeter of foot. (A potential solution that I
suspect has a greater likelihood of success is for the Treasury to require
all tax payments to be made by checks against reservable bank deposits.)
The second way in which a decoupling of the central bank’s
operations from the markets that matter for monetary policy could come
about is the possibility that banks’ demand for central bank liabilities, for
use as settlement balances, may atrophy. The main question here is
whether the central bank will continue to have enough of a natural
advantage in the provision of net interbank settlement services so that
banks will always need central bank liabilities for this purpose—and, if
not, whether regulation can solve the problem. It is important to
emphasize once again that nobody denies that the central bank can
determine the quantity of claims outstanding on its own balance sheet, or
the interest rate at which those claims exchange for something else. Here
too the issue is one of decoupling at the margin: whether the increase or
decrease of the exchange rate on central bank liabilities against some
other asset would continue to be connected to the broader constellation of
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activity.
What if either or both of these two technological possibilities were to
become reality? One view, these days often expressed, is that the central
bank need not do anything: that a mere expression of intentions (what
Charles Goodhart (2000) has called “open mouth policy”) is sufﬁcient. A
point I have now sought to make in several papers is that stated
intentions matter only if there is something credible to back them
up—and, moreover, that whether the central bank can or cannot back up
its intentions is a matter of institutional arrangements, subject to change.
The image that I used in Friedman (1999) to illustrate this point,
taken from a 1965 ﬁlm directed by Henry Levin, is that of the twelfth-
century Chinese emperor Wang Wei-shao composing a poem in elegant
Chinese calligraphy and explaining that the poem, if read carefully
enough to catch the subtle nuance, hints at his displeasure with the
Mongol barbarians who are currently creating a disturbance on the Ch’in
empire’s western frontier—and, further, that this veiled expression of
disapproval on his part will be sufﬁcient to cause the barbarians to desist
and go away. The point of the story, which becomes clear later in the ﬁlm,
is that Wang Wei-shao was the emperor defeated by Genghis Khan. There
may once have been a time when a subtle poem in an emperor’s elegant
calligraphy was sufﬁcient to make attackers break off, but by Wang
Wei-shao’s day that time had obviously passed.
The generic point applies to central banks as well. Alan Greenspan
will not be the Wang Wei-shao of the twenty-ﬁrst century. But circum-
stances change, especially when political institutions and advancing
technology are central to the issue. Expressions of intent on the central
bank’s part may be sufﬁcient if the capacity exists to back them up. And
if everybody has grown up in a world in which that capacity existed,
people may continue for some time to behave in the same way even after
it has atrophied or disappeared. But eventually objective reality catches up.
CONCLUDING REMARKS:R ULES VERSUS DISCRETION
One ﬁnal aspect of interest-rate-based monetary policymaking re-
mains to be addressed in conclusion: Interest rates do not conveniently
serve as the fulcrum for straightforward, easily articulated rules govern-
ing the conduct of monetary policy. For Wicksellian reasons, it is
implausible to think in terms of a ﬁxed interest rate. And once a central
bank bases its policy on setting but varying an interest rate, the consid-
erations it will want to take into account in doing so will normally be far
too complex to embody in any simple rule. For just this reason, advocates
of monetary policy rules have traditionally thought in terms of variables
other than interest rates.
How important a consideration is this? Twenty or so years ago, when
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much of the industrialized world, the theory of time inconsistency
suggested that this chronic inﬂation was a natural consequence of
discretionary monetary policymaking. The inferred gain from adopting
some kind of policy rule was large. One often unstated implication of this
line of argument was that central banks should frame their monetary
policymaking in terms of variables other than interest rates.
Today the explanation of inﬂation as a consequence of time incon-
sistency—and in particular the implied preference for monetary policy
rules—is far less persuasive. Not only have most industrialized countries
succeeded in slowing their inﬂation, but in most cases they managed to
do so without changing (in some cases, before changing) their monetary
policymaking arrangements. The United States certainly stands as a case
in point.
This experience has not necessarily invalidated the underlying time
inconsistency theory. As researchers investigating the consequences of
time inconsistency pointed out, solutions other than policy rules—for
example, inﬂuences stemming from the reputation of the central bank
and from policymakers’ awareness of those inﬂuences—can also sufﬁce
to mitigate any resulting inﬂation problem. What this experience has
shown, however, is that a monetary policy governed by rules is not a
necessary part of a successful noninﬂationary strategy. The implied
presumption against making policy by setting interest rates therefore
does not follow.
Even apart from the speciﬁcs of the debate over time inconsistency
and the origins of the postwar inﬂation, the case for rules governing
monetary policy has always been problematic at best. The difﬁculty—as
many economists as well as central bankers have long recognized—is the
tension between rules that are simple enough to be externally monitor-
able, and hence to achieve the goals that advocates of monetary policy
rules are seeking in the ﬁrst place, and rules that are sufﬁciently complex
(if this is even possible) to encompass the many and diverse inﬂuences
that a real-world central bank presumably will, indeed should, take into
account. This difﬁculty is not new, nor is it speciﬁc to monetary policy. As
Aristotle wrote in The Politics, “it is impossible that all things should be
precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but
actions are concerned with particulars” (p. 39).
Most central banks, including the Federal Reserve, implement their
monetary policy by setting interest rates. At least in today’s world, there
is little reason to do otherwise.
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